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INTRODUCTION
When we try to understand cyber governance, it 
is important to remember how new cyberspace is. 
“Cyberspace is an operational domain framed by use of 
electronics to…exploit information via interconnected 
systems and their associated infra structure” (Kuehl 
2009). While the US Defense Department sponsored a 
modest connection of a few computers called ARPANET 
(Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) in 1969, 
and the World Wide Web was conceived in 1989, it has 
only been in the last decade and a half that the number 
of websites burgeoned, and businesses begin to use this 
new technology to shift production and procurement in 
complex global supply chains. In 1992, there were only a 
million users on the Internet (Starr 2009, 52); today, there 
are nearly three billion, and the Internet has become a 
substrate of modern economic, social and political life. 
And the volatility continues. Analysts are now trying to 
understand the implications of ubiquitous mobility, the 
“Internet of everything” and storage of “big data.” Over 
the past 15 years, the advances in technology have far 
outstripped the ability of institutions of governance to 
respond, as well as our thinking about governance.
Since the 1970s, political scientists have looked at the 
international governance processes of various global 
affairs issues through the perspective of regime theory 
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Ruggie 1982). This paper is 
a mapping exercise of cyber governance using regime 
theory. Regimes are the “principles, norms, rules and 
procedures that govern issue areas in international 
affairs,” but these concepts have rarely been applied to 
the new cyber domain (Krasner 1983). In its early days, 
thinking about cyber governance was relatively primitive. 
Ideological libertarians proclaimed that “information 
wants to be free,” portraying the Internet as the end of 
government controls. In practice, however, governments 
and geographical jurisdictions have been playing a major 
role in cyber governance right from the start (see Goldsmith 
and Wu 2006).
Cyberspace is a unique combination of physical and 
virtual properties.1 The physical infrastructure layer 
largely follows the economic laws of rival resources 
and increasing marginal costs, and the political laws of 
sovereign governmental jurisdiction and control. The 
virtual or informational layers have economic network 
characteristics of increasing returns to scale, and political 
practices that make government jurisdictional control 
1   Martin Libicki (2009, 12) distinguishes three layers of cyberspace: 
physical, syntactic and semantic. However, with applications added 
upon applications, the Internet can be conceived in multiple layers. See 
Blumenthal and Clark (2009, 206ff) for a four-layer model. Nazli Choucri 
(2012) has also proposed multiple layers.
difficult.2 Attacks from the informational realm, where 
costs are low, can be launched against the physical domain, 
where resources are scarce and expensive. Conversely, 
control of the physical layer can have both territorial and 
extraterritorial effects on the informational layers.
Governments and non-state actors cooperate and 
compete for power in this complex arena. Cyber power 
can be defined in terms of a set of resources that relate 
to the creation, control and communication of electronic 
and computer-based information — infrastructure, 
networks, software and human skills. This includes the 
Internet of networked computers, but also intranets, 
mesh nets, cellular technologies, cables and space-based 
communications. Cyber power can be used to produce 
preferred outcomes within cyberspace, or it can use cyber 
instruments to produce preferred outcomes in other 
domains outside cyberspace. The Internet, which is a 
network of thousands of independently owned networks, 
is only part of cyberspace. Cyber attacks can come through 
several vectors, such as humans and hardware supply 
chains, as well as malware delivered over the network. 
Internet governance is the application by governments, the 
private sector and civil society of principles, norms, rules, 
procedures and programs that shape the evolution and use 
of the Internet (Working Group on Internet Governance 
[WGIG] 2005). Naming and numbering is only a small part 
of Internet governance, and while Internet governance 
is at the heart of cyberspace, it is only a subset of cyber 
governance.
ASPECTS OF CYBER GOVERNANCE
There is considerable insecurity in cyberspace because the 
barriers to entry are low and offence is cheaper than defence, 
which is why it is sometimes depicted as analogous to the 
ungoverned and lawless Wild West. In practice, however, 
there are many areas of private and public governance. 
Certain technical standards related to Internet protocols 
are set (or not) by consensus among engineers involved 
in the non-governmental Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and 
others. Their informal procedures eschew voting and are 
sometimes summarized as “rough consensus and running 
code.”
The determination as to which of these standards is broadly 
applied often depends upon private corporate decisions 
about their inclusion in commercial products. Private 
contracts among different tiers of Internet service providers 
(ISPs) use BGP (border gateway protocols) and undersea 
cables to connect the many networks that make up the 
Internet. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) has had the legal status of a non-
2   Jonathan Zittrain points out that may change as unowned apps, such 
as email, give way to proprietary apps, such as Facebook or Twitter direct 
messaging (pers. comm.).PaPer SerieS: no. 1 — May 2014  
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profit corporation under US law, although its procedures 
have evolved to include government voices (but not votes). 
In any event, its mandate is limited to domain names and 
assignment of top-level numeric addresses, not the full 
panoply of cyberspace governance. National governments 
control copyright and intellectual property laws, although 
they are subject to negotiation and litigation, sometimes 
within the frameworks of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Governments also determine national spectrum 
allocation within an international framework negotiated 
at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
The United Nations Charter, the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) and various regional organizations provide a 
general overarching framework as national governments 
try to manage problems of security and espionage. The 
Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (2014) in 
Budapest provides a legal framework that has been ratified 
by 42 states. Incident response teams (computer emergency 
response teams [CERTs] and CSIRTs [Computer Security 
Incident Response Teams]) cooperate regionally and 
globally to share information about disruptions. Bilateral 
negotiations, track two dialogues, regular forums and 
independent commissions strive to develop norms and 
confidence-building measures. Much of the governance 
efforts occur within national legal frameworks, although 
the technological volatility of the cyber domain means that 
laws and regulations are always chasing a moving target.
The cyberspace domain is often described as a public good 
or a global commons, but these terms are an imperfect 
fit. A public good is one from which all can benefit and 
none should be excluded, and while this may describe 
some of the information protocols of the Internet, it does 
not describe the physical infrastructure, which is a scarce 
proprietary resource located within the boundaries of 
sovereign states and more like a “club good” available to 
some, but not all. And cyberspace is not a commons like the 
high seas, because parts of it are under sovereign control. 
At best, it is an “imperfect commons” or a condominium 
of joint ownership without well-developed rules (pers. 
comm. with James A. Lewis; see Center for Strategic 
International Studies [CSIS] 2008). It has also been termed 
a club good where a shared resource is subject to various 
degrees of exclusion according the rules and agreements of 
different institutions (Raymond 2013).
Cyberspace can also be categorized as what Elinor Ostrom 
termed a “common pool resource,” from which exclusion 
is difficult and exploitation by one party can subtract value 
for other parties.3 Government is not the sole solution to 
such common pool resource problems. Ostrom showed 
that community self-organization is possible under certain 
conditions. However, the conditions that she associated 
3   See Ostram et al. (1999, 278), for a challenge to the Garrett Hardin’s 
(1968, 1243) formulation of “the tragedy of the commons.”
with successful self-governance are weak in many parts of 
the cyber domain because of the large size of the resource, 
the large number of users and the poor understanding of 
how the system will evolve (among others).
In its earliest days, the Internet was like a small village 
of known users — an authentication layer of code was 
not necessary and development of norms was simple in 
a climate of trust. All of that changed with burgeoning 
growth and commercial use. While the openness and 
accessibility of cyberspace as a medium of communication 
provide valuable benefits to all, free riding behaviour in 
the form of crime, attacks and threats creates insecurity. 
The result is a demand for protection that can lead to 
fragmentation, “walled gardens,” private networks and 
cyber equivalents to the seventeenth century enclosures 
that were used to solve that era’s “tragedy of the commons” 
(Ostram 2009, 421; Hurwitz 2009). Internet experts worry 
about “balkanization” or fragmentation. To some extent 
that has already occurred, yet most states do not want 
fragmentation into a “splinter-net” that would curtail 
economic benefits.
Providing security is a classic function of government, and 
some observers believe that growing insecurity will lead 
to an increased role for governments in cyberspace. Many 
states desire to extend their sovereignty in cyberspace, 
seeking the technological means to do so. As Diebert 
and Rphozinski (2010) put it, “securing cyberspace has 
definitely entailed a ‘return of the state’ but not in ways 
that suggest a return to the traditional Westphalian 
paradigm of state sovereignty.” Moreover, while accounts 
of cyberwar have been exaggerated, cyber espionage is 
rampant and more than 30 governments are reputed to 
have developed offensive capabilities and doctrines for the 
use of cyber weapons (Rid 2013). US Cyber Command has 
announced plans to employ 6,000 professionals by 2016 
(Garamone 2014). Ever since the Stuxnet virus was used 
to disrupt Iran’s nuclear centrifuge program in 2009 and 
2010, the hypothetical use of cyber weapons has become 
very real to governments (Demchak and Dombrowski 
2011, 32).
Efforts to attack or secure a government network also 
involve the use of cyber weapons by non-state actors. The 
number of criminal attacks has increased with estimates 
of global costs ranging from US$80–400 billion annually 
(Lewis and Baker 2013, 5). Corporations and private actors, 
however, can also help to protect the Internet, and this often 
entails devolution of responsibilities and authority (Deibert 
and Rohozinski 2010, 30; see Demchak and Dombrowski 
2011). For example, banking and financial firms have 
developed their own elaborate systems of security and 
punishment through networks of connectedness, such 
as depriving repeat offenders of their trading rights, 
and by slowing speeds and raising transactions costs for 
addresses that are associated with suspect behaviour. 
Informal consortia, such as the Conficker Working Group, THe reGiMe CoMPLex For ManaGinG GLobaL Cyber aCTiViTieS
JoSPeH S. nye, Jr. • 7
have arisen to deal with particular problems, and hacker 
groups like Anonymous have acted to punish corporate 
and government behaviour of which they disapprove.
Governments want to protect the Internet so their societies 
can continue to benefit from it, but at the same time, they 
also want to protect their societies from what might come 
through the Internet. China, for example, has developed 
a firewall and pressures Chinese companies to self-censor 
behind it, and the country could reduce its connections to 
the Internet if it is attacked (Clarke and Knake 2012, 146). 
Nonetheless, China — and other governments — still seeks 
the economic benefits of connectivity. The tension between 
protection of the Internet and protecting society leads to 
imperfect compromises (see Zittrain 2008). Reaching an 
agreement on norms to govern security is complicated 
by the fact that while Western countries speak of “cyber 
security,” authoritarian countries such as Russia and China 
refer to “information security,” which includes censorship 
of content that would be constitutionally protected in 
democratic states.
These differences were dramatized at the December 2012 
World Conference on International Telecommunications 
(WCIT) convened by the ITU in Dubai. Although the 
meeting was ostensibly about updating telephony 
regulations, the underlying issue was the extent to which 
the ITU would play a role in the governance of the Internet. 
Authoritarian countries, and many developing countries, 
feel that their approach to security and development 
would benefit from the UN bloc politics that characterizes 
the ITU. Moreover, they dislike the fact that ICANN is a 
non-profit incorporated in the United States and at least 
partially accountable to the US Commerce Department. 
Western governments, on the other hand, fear that the 
cumbersome features of the ITU would undercut the 
flexibility of the “multi-stakeholder” process that stresses 
the role of the private and non-profit sectors as well as 
governments. While there are different interpretations of 
multi-stakeholderism, which can be traced back to the 
Geneva and Tunis meetings of the UN’s World Summit on 
the Information Society in 2003 and 2005 (Maurer 2011), 
respectively, the vote in Dubai was 89 to 55 (Klimburg 
2013, 3)  against the “Western” governments (including 
Japan and India). In the aftermath of the WCIT conference, 
there were articles about the crisis in Internet governance 
and worries about a new Cold War (see Klimburg 2013; 
Mueller 2012). Many of these fears were overstated, 
however, if one looks at cyber governance through the lens 
of regime theory.
REGIMES AND REGIME COMPLEXES
Regimes are a subset of norms, which are shared 
expectations about appropriate behaviour. Norms can 
be descriptive, prescriptive or both. They can also be 
institutionalized (or not) to varying degrees. A regime 
has a degree of hierarchical coherence among norms. A 
regime complex is a loosely coupled set of regimes. On a 
spectrum of formal institutionalization, a regime complex 
is intermediate between a single legal instrument at one 
end and fragmented arrangements at the other. While 
there is no single regime for the governance of cyberspace, 
there is a set of loosely coupled norms and institutions that 
ranks somewhere between an integrated institution that 
imposes regulation through hierarchical rules, and highly 
fragmented practices and institutions with no identifiable 
core and non-existent linkages.
The oval map of cyber governance activities in Figure 1 
mixes norms, institutions and procedures, some of which 
are large in scale, while others are relatively small; some are 
quite formal and some very informal. The labels are often 
arbitrary.4 The oval is not designed to map all governance 
activities in cyberspace (which is a massive undertaking) 
and, thus, is deliberately incomplete. Like all heuristics, it 
distorts reality as it simplifies. Nonetheless, it is a useful 
corrective to the usual UN versus multi-stakeholder 
dichotomy as an approach to cyber governance, and it 
locates Internet governance within the larger context of 
cyber governance. First, it indicates the extent and wide 
range of actors and activities related to governance that 
exist in the space. Second, it separates issues related to 
the technical function of connectivity, such as domain 
name addresses (DNS) and technical standards where a 
relatively coherent and hierarchical regime exists, from 
the much broader range of issues that constitute the 
larger regime complex. Third, it encourages us to think 
of layers and domains of cyber governance that are much 
broader than just the issues of DNS and ICANN, which 
have limited functions and little to do directly with larger 
issues such as security, human rights or development. As 
Laura DeNardis (2014, 226) writes, “a question such as 
‘who should control the Internet, the United Nations or 
some other organization’ makes no sense whatsoever. The 
appropriate question involves determining what is the 
most effective form of governance in each specific context.”
When we look at the whole range of cyber governance 
issues, some of the bipolarity in alignments that 
characterized the WCIT begins to erode. Liberalism is 
not the only divide. For example, some of the countries 
that voted against the West were not authoritarian, but 
were post-colonial or developing countries concerned 
about issues of sovereignty, which can be swayed by 
programs to develop their cyber capabilities or to protect 
the interests of their telecom companies. Also, within the 
liberal democratic bloc, there are important differences 
between the United States and Europe over issues of 
privacy, which have been increased by Edward Snowden’s 
revelations regarding surveillance. Such issues may wind 
up having strong effects and being resolved within trade 
4   I am indebted to Alexander Klimburg for help with the labels.PaPer SerieS: no. 1 — May 2014  
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Figure 1: The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities
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agreements like the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership. It oversimplifies the politics of 
cyber governance to compress all of these dimensions 
into a bipolar dispute over liberal versus authoritarian 
approaches to content control.
This mapping of a regime complex also indicates the 
importance of linkages of cyber to normative and regime 
structures outside the issue area. The various actors that 
are located at the edge of the oval have independent 
structures of power and institutions outside the cyber 
issue area, but still play a significant role in issues of cyber 
governance. In other words, much of cyber governance 
comes from actors and institutions that are not focused 
purely on cyber. Moreover, these institutions compete 
and are used in a process of “contested multilateralism,” 
whereby state and non-state actors seek to shape the 
norms that govern activities within the oval (Morse and 
Keohane, forthcoming).
Finally, this approach helps to relieve some of the fears 
of extreme balkanization. Interference with the central 
regime of domain names and standards could fragment 
the functioning of the Internet, and it might make sense 
to consider a special treaty limited to that area (Sofaer, 
Clark and Diffie 2010). However, trying to develop a 
treaty for the broad range of cyberspace as a whole could 
be counterproductive. The loose coupling among issues 
that now exists permits cooperation among actors in some 
areas at the same time that they have disagreements in 
others. For example, China and the United States can use 
the Internet for economic cooperation even as they differ 
on human rights and content control. Countries could 
cooperate on cybercrime, even while they differ on laws of 
war or espionage.
What regime complexes lack in coherence, they make up 
in flexibility and adaptability. Particularly in a domain 
with extremely volatile technological change, these 
characteristics help both states and non-state actors to 
adjust to uncertainty. Moreover, they permit the formation 
of clubs or smaller groupings of like-minded states than can 
pioneer the development of norms that may be extended 
to larger groups at a later time. As Keohane and Victor 
(2011, 7) note of the regime complex for climate change, 
“adaptability and flexibility are particularly important 
in a setting...in which the most demanding international 
commitments are interdependent yet governments vary 
widely in their interest and ability to implement them”.
NORMS AND CYBER SUB-ISSUES
The norms that affect the various sub-issues of regime 
complexes can be compared along a variety of dimensions 
such as effectiveness, resilience, autonomy and others 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997). It is more useful 
to compare cyber issues in terms of four dimensions: 
depth, breadth, fabric and compliance. Depth refers to 
the hierarchical coherence of a set of rules or norms. Is 
there an overarching set of rules, which are compatible 
and mutually reinforcing (even if they are not adhered 
to or complied with by all actors)? For example, on the 
issue of domain names and standards, the norms, rules 
and procedures have coherence and depth; however, on 
the issue of espionage, there are few. Breadth refers to the 
scope of the numbers of state and non-state actors that 
have accepted a set of norms (whether they fully comply 
or not). For instance, on the issue of crime, 42 states have 
ratified the Budapest convention.
“Fabric” refers to the mix of state and non-state actors in an 
issue area. This is particularly interesting in cyber because 
the low barriers to entry mean many of the resources and 
much of the action is controlled by non-state actors. Issues 
with a high degree of state control have a “tight fabric”; 
those where non-state actors are pre-eminent have a 
loosely woven fabric. Security issues such as the laws of 
war in cyber have a tight fabric of sovereign control, while 
the DNS has a loose fabric in which non-state actors play 
a major role. As suggested above, a loosely woven fabric 
is not synonymous with shallowness or incoherence. A 
fourth dimension for comparison is compliance: how 
widespread is the behavioural adherence to a set of 
norms? For instance, on the sub-issue of domain names 
and standards, compliance is high; on issues of privacy it 
is mixed; and on human rights it is low. Some of the major 
sub-issues of the cyber regime complex are compared 
along these dimensions below. (The list is not designed to 
be complete and other rows for trade, intellectual property 
or development can easily be added to the table.)
Table 1: Some Issues in the Cyber Regime Complex
Depth Breadth Fabric Compliance
DNS/standards High High Loose High
Crime High Medium Mixed Mixed
War/Sabotage Medium Low Tight Low
Espionage Low Low Mixed Low
Privacy Medium Low Mixed Mixed
Content control Low Low Loose Low
Human Rights Medium Medium Loose Low
Source: Author.PaPer SerieS: no. 1 — May 2014  
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The variation in the characteristics of these sub-issues 
suggests why cyberspace is likely to remain a regime 
complex rather than a single, strong regime for some time. 
As Keohane and Victor (2011, 8) argue in regard to climate 
change, it is “actually many different cooperation problems, 
implying different tasks and structures. Three forces — 
the distribution of interests, the gains from linkages, and 
the management of uncertainty — help to account for the 
variation in the institutional outcomes, from integration to 
fragmentation.” This is clearly true of cyberspace as well, 
though it is important to notice the difference there is one 
area of the cyber domain where interests and gains from 
linkage are strong enough that a coherent regime exists.
Partly because of strong common interests in connectivity, 
and partly because of path dependency and the way the 
basic standards of the Internet were established in the 
United States, there is a core regime related to standards and 
assigned names and numbers including management of the 
DNS root zone servers. While there has been controversy 
about the status of ICANN, and the US government has 
indicated it plans to devolve the IANA function to ICANN 
in the future, no state has thus far found it would benefit 
from ceasing to comply. The development of standards is 
advanced primarily by non-state actors, such as the IETF, 
the W3C, the IEEE and others, where states and voting 
have minimal effect. This is the area of cyber where the 
concept of multi-stakeholderism is most apparent.
Crime might seem to be the next likely sub-issue to be 
susceptible to regime formation. The issue has a loose 
fabric in which spammers, criminals and other free riders 
impose large costs on both states and private actors. The 
Budapest convention provides a coherent structure with 
depth, but its breadth has been limited by its origins in 
Europe. Many post-colonial countries and authoritarian 
countries such as Russia and China object to obligations 
that they see as intrusions on their sovereignty as well 
as the European origin of the norms. Some developing 
countries also see little to gain by joining, as few of their 
national companies would benefit, while they fear the 
potentially high costs of enforcement, should they to 
become signatories. Moreover, some private companies 
find it is in their economic interest to hide the extent to 
which they have been victimized and simply absorb it 
as a business cost, rather than suffer reputational and 
regulatory costs. States may also think that the costs are 
not high enough to merit action — even if cybercrime 
costs US$400 billion, it is still only 0.05 percent of global 
GDP.  Thus, insurance markets are difficult to develop 
and compliance is far from satisfactory. This may change 
in the future if the costs of cybercrime increase, given its 
sophistication and scope. Despite differences over what 
information activities constitute a crime in authoritarian 
and democratic countries, cooperation could be modelled 
after extradition laws that relate to actions that are “doubly 
criminal” — that is, illegal in both countries.
War has an overarching normative structure that is derived 
from the UN Charter and the LOAC. The issue has a tight 
structure growing out of the nature of war as a sovereign 
action of states. The third meeting of the UN’s GGE, which 
concluded in July 2013, agreed in principle that such 
laws applied in the cyber domain. What this means in 
practice, when there is great technological uncertainty, is 
more challenging. While a group of NATO legal scholars 
has produced the Tallinn Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare — which attempts to translate 
general principles regarding proportion, discrimination 
and collateral damage into the cyber domain — the scope 
of the acceptance of these principles has been limited by its 
origins (Schmitt 2013). While there has been no cyberwar 
in a strict sense, there has been cyber sabotage, such as 
Stuxnet, and cyber instruments, such as distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks, which were used in the Russian 
invasion of Georgia. On the other hand, there have been 
press accounts that the United States decided not to use 
cyber adjuncts in Iraq, Libya and elsewhere, because 
of uncertainties about civilians and collateral damage 
(Schmitt and Shanker 2011; Markoff and Shanker 2009). 
Thus, compliance is judged with these norms as mixed.
According to press accounts, there is extensive use of cyber 
espionage by a wide variety of states and non-state actors. 
While espionage is an ancient practice that is not against 
international law, it often violates the domestic laws of 
sovereign states. Traditionally (for example, in the US-
Soviet competition during the Cold War), rough “rules of 
the road” led to reciprocal expulsions and reductions in 
diplomatic missions as a means of regulating the friction 
created by espionage. Thus far, cyber espionage is so easy 
and relatively safe that no such rules of the road have 
been developed. The United States has complained about 
Chinese cyber espionage that steals intellectual property, 
and raised the issue at the summit between US President 
Barack Obama and President of the People’s Republic of 
China Xi Jinping in June 2013. However, the US effort to 
create a norm that differentiates spying for commercial 
gain from all other spying has been lost in the noise created 
by the revelations of extensive National Security Agency 
(NSA) surveillance released by Snowden (Goldsmith 
2013). Moreover, normative efforts have been plagued 
by the loose fabric of the issue. Although the exposure 
of Chinese spying in 2013 by Mandiant suggested a clear 
government connection, many other instances are more 
ambiguous about whether they are by government or non-
state actors (Sanger, Barboza and Perlroth 2013).
Privacy is a sub-issue of growing importance given the 
increases in computing power and storage that are often 
summarized as the “era of big data.” There are widespread 
concerns about companies, criminals and governments 
storing and misusing personal data. At the same time, in 
the age of social media, there are changing generational 
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appropriate lines between public and private. Private 
terms-of-service agreements are often cumbersome and 
opaque to consumers. Additionally, personal identification 
information, once on the Internet, can end up in numerous 
places, rendering futile most efforts to have the initial 
posting site remove it. At the same time, European efforts 
to enforce a “right to be forgotten” with legal excisions of 
history have raised concerns among some civil libertarians. 
The concept of privacy is poorly defined and understood, 
and has very different legal structures in Europe and the 
United States, not to mention authoritarian states (see 
Brenner 2014). Thus, it is not surprising that while there 
are conflicting norms, the normative structure for the sub-
issue lacks depth, breadth or compliance.
Content control is another sub-issue with conflicting 
norms with little depth or breadth. For authoritarian 
states, information that crosses borders by any means and 
jeopardizes the stability of a regime is a threat. The SCO has, 
therefore, expressed a concern about information security, 
and Russia and China have proposed UN resolutions to 
that effect. In practice, authoritarian countries filter such 
threatening messages and would like to have a normative 
structure that would encourage other states to comply. 
But the United States could not stop a Falun Gang email 
to China without violating the free speech clauses of the 
US Constitution. This is why democratic countries refer to 
cyber security and argue against the control of the content 
of Internet packets.
At the same time, democratic countries do control some 
content. Most try to stop child pornography but are 
divided on issues such as hate speech, and many Internet 
corporations have been caught between conflicting national 
legal systems. Moreover, this sub-issue has a loosely woven 
fabric and various private groups create black and gray 
lists of what they regard as violators of various norms. 
In some cases, these vigilantes have been able to borrow 
the authority of government (Mueller 2010, chapter 9). 
Copyright is another important area related to content 
control. For example, the proposed Stop Online Piracy 
Act in the US Congress would have required Web hosting 
companies, search engines and ISPs to sever relations 
with websites and users found in violation of copyright. 
While such measures have met with strong resistance, it is 
likely they will remain contentious both in domestic and 
transnational politics. Thus, there is no depth, breadth or 
widespread compliance with a normative structure for 
content control.
Human rights is a cyber sub-issue that has many of the 
same problems of conflicting values that plague content 
control, but there is an overriding legal structure in the form 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, 
in June 2012, the UN Human Rights Council affirmed 
that the same rights that people have off-line must also be 
protected online. Within the declaration, however, there is 
a potential tension between Article 19 (freedom of opinion 
and expression) and Article 29 (public order and general 
welfare). On the other hand, different states interpret the 
declaration in different ways, and authoritarian states 
that feel threatened by freedom of speech or assembly 
make no exceptions for the Internet. The US government 
has proclaimed an Internet freedom agenda, but has not 
explained whether this includes a right of privacy for 
foreigners. This agenda has also been complicated in the 
wake of the Snowden revelations. In 2011, the Netherlands 
held a conference that launched a Freedom Online 
Coalition, which now includes 22 states committed to 
human rights online, but the disparities in behaviour lead 
to the conclusion that the normative structure in this sub-
issue lacks depth, breadth or compliance. Nonetheless, the 
loose fabric of the issue allows ample opportunity for non-
state actors to press for human rights in cyberspace. For 
instance, the civil society organization, Global Network 
Initiative, has been pressing private companies to sign 
up to principles that advance transparency and respect 
human rights (MacKinnon 2012, chapter 14).
THE FUTURE DYNAMICS OF THE 
CYBER REGIME COMPLEX
Given the youth of the issue and the volatility of the 
technology, there are many potential paths along which 
cyber norms may evolve. Regime theorists have developed 
three quite different causal models that tend to complement 
each other. Realists argue that regimes are created and 
sustained by the most powerful state. Such hegemons 
have the incentive to provide public goods and discipline 
free riders because they will benefit disproportionately. 
But, as their power ebbs, the maintenance of regimes 
becomes more difficult (Gilpin 1987). From this point of 
view, the declining US control of the Internet suggests 
future fragmentation.
A second approach, liberal institutionalism, emphasizes 
the rational self-interest of states seeking the benefits 
of cooperative solutions to collective action problems. 
Regimes and their institutions help states achieve benefits 
by providing information and reducing transactions costs. 
They cut contracting costs, provide focal points, enhance 
transparency and credibility, monitor compliance and 
provide a basis for sanctioning deviant behaviour (Keohane 
1984). This approach helps to explain why a regime exists 
for the DNS where perceived interests in cooperation are 
high, while a regime does not exist in the sub-issue of 
espionage where interests diverge significantly.
A constructivist set of theories emphasizes cognitive 
factors, such as how constituencies, groups and social 
movements change the perception and organization of 
their interests over time (Ruggie 1998). It is a cliché that 
states act in their national interest. The important question 
is how those interests are perceived and implemented. 
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the technology is new, and states are still struggling to 
understand and define their interests. In a chronological 
analogy, state learning of interests in the cyber domain is 
equivalent to about the year 1960, in what was then a new 
technology of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy (Nye 
2011a). It was not until 1963 that the first arms control treaty 
was ratified — the atmospheric test ban — and 1968 that 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. The situation in 
cyber is made more complex by the much greater roles of a 
diverse set of private and non-profit actors responding to 
rapid social and economic change. Transnational epistemic 
communities of people and groups that share ideas and 
outlooks — such as ISOC and the IETF — play important 
roles (Adler and Haas 1992). Over time, the extent and 
interests of these cyber epistemic communities has grown. 
Cognitive theories help to explain the evolution of norms, 
but also why there is considerable fragmentation in the 
normative structures of sub-issues like privacy, content 
control and human rights.
Optimists about the development of norms in the cyber 
regime complex can point to some recent evidence of 
progress. For example, the disagreement between the 
sovereigntist and multi-stakeholder philosophies seemed 
somewhat less stark at the NETmundial conference in 
Sao Paolo, Brazil in 2014, than at the WCIT conference in 
Dubai in 2012. Moreover, while early meetings of the GGE 
were unable to reach consensus, the latest meeting reached 
agreement on a number of points, including the principle 
that international laws of war applied to cyberspace. In 
addition, the number of states acceding to the Council 
of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime has gradually 
increased, and INTERPOL has established a cybercrime 
centre in Singapore. Forty-one states have agreed to use 
the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
to stop sales of spyware to authoritarian countries. There 
has been an increase in international and transnational 
cooperation among CERTs. Before the recent dispute over 
Ukraine, the United States and Russia agreed that their 
hotline arrangements would be extended to cyber events. 
The United States and China established an official working 
group on cyber in 2013. Numerous track two groups and 
various private conferences and commissions continued 
to work on the development of norms. Industry groups 
continued to work on standards regarding everything 
from undersea cable protection to financial services. And 
non-profit groups pressed companies and governments to 
protect privacy and human rights.
Conversely, pessimists about normative change in the cyber 
regime complex point to the overall decline of the trust that 
is so important in the issue area. Some observers date this 
loss to what they see as the militarization of cyberspace 
symbolized by: the DDOS attacks that accompanied the 
Russian disruption of Estonia in 2007 and invasion of 
Georgia in 2008; the establishment of the American Cyber 
Command in 2009; and the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010. 
Others point to the 2013 Snowden revelations that the 
NSA not only carried out espionage (which is not new 
or unique), but also subverted encryption standards 
and open-source software. Some technologists believe 
that trust can be rebuilt from the bottom up with new 
software technologies, as well as procedures for inspection 
of hardware supply chains. Others argue that low trust 
will be a persistent condition and it will exacerbate a 
fragmenting trend toward greater control by sovereign 
states (see Schneier 2013).
Some analysts reinforce their pessimistic projections 
by pointing to realist theories about the decline of US 
hegemony over the Internet. In its early days, the Internet 
was largely American, but today, China has twice as 
many users as the United States. Where once only roman 
characters were used on the internet and HTML tags 
were based on abbreviated English words, now there are 
generic top-level domain names in Chinese, Arabic and 
Cyrillic scripts, with more alphabets expected to come 
online shortly (ICANN 2013). And in 2014, the United 
States announced that it would relax its Department 
of Commerce’s supervision of ICANN and the IANA 
function. Some experts worried that this would open the 
way for authoritarian states to try to exert control over 
the system of root zone servers, and use that to censor the 
addresses of opponents.
Such fears seem exaggerated both on technical grounds 
and in their underlying premises. Not only would such 
censorship be difficult, but, as liberal institutionalist 
theories point out, there are self-interested grounds for 
states to avoid such fragmentation of the Internet. In 
addition, the descriptions in the decline in US power 
in the cyber regime are overstated. Not only does the 
United States remain the second-largest user of the 
Internet, but it is also the home of eight of the 10 largest 
global information companies (Statista 2013).5 Moreover, 
when one looks at the composition of voluntary multi-
stakeholder communities such as the IETF, one sees a 
disproportionate number of Americans participating for 
path dependent and technical expertise reasons. From an 
institutionalist or constructivist viewpoint, the loosening 
of US influence over ICANN could be seen as a strategy 
for strengthening the institution and reinforcing the 
American multi-stakeholder philosophy rather than as a 
sign of defeat (Zittrain 2014).
It is interesting to look at the experience of other regimes 
when US pre-eminence diminished in an issue area. In 
trade, for example, the United States was by far the largest 
trading nation when the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) was created in 1947, and the United States 
deliberately accepted trade discrimination by Europe and 
5   Note that Yahoo and Yahoo-Japan have been treated as one entity for 
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Japan as part of its Cold War strategy. After those countries 
recovered, they joined the United States in a club of like-
minded nations within the GATT (Keohane and Nye 
2001). In the 1990s, as other states’ shares of global trade 
increased, the United States supported the expansion 
of GATT into the WTO, and the club model became 
obsolete. The United States supported Chinese accession 
to the WTO and China surpassed it as the world’s largest 
trading nation. While global rounds of trade negotiations 
became more difficult to accomplish and various free trade 
agreements proliferated, the rules of the WTO continued 
to provide a general framework where the norm of most 
favoured nation status and reciprocity created a structure 
where particular club deals could be generalized to a 
larger number of countries. Moreover, new entrants, such 
as China, found it in their interests to observe even adverse 
judgments of the WTO dispute settlement process.
Similar to the non-proliferation regime, when the United 
States had a nuclear monopoly in the 1940s, it proposed 
the Baruch Plan for UN control, which the Soviet Union 
rejected in order to pursue it own nuclear weapons. In the 
1950s as nuclear technology spread, the United States used 
the Atoms for Peace program, coupled with inspections 
by the new International Atomic Energy Agency, to try to 
separate the peaceful from weapons purposes. During the 
1960s, the five nuclear weapon states negotiated the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which promised peaceful assistance to 
states that accepted a legal status of non-nuclear weapon 
states. In the 1970s, after India’s explosion of a nuclear 
device and the further spread of technology for the 
enrichment and reprocessing of fissile materials, the United 
States and like-minded states created a Nuclear Suppliers 
Group that agreed “to exercise restraint” in the export of 
sensitive technologies, as well as an International National 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which called into question 
the optimistic projections about the use of plutonium fuels. 
While none of these regime adaptations were perfect, and 
problems persist with North Korea and Iran today, the net 
effect of the normative structure was to slow the growth in 
the number of nuclear weapon states from the 25 expected 
in the 1960s to the nine that exist today (see Nye 1981). In 
2003, the United States launched the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, a loosely structured grouping of countries 
that shares information and coordinates efforts to stop 
trafficking in nuclear proliferation-related materials.
In short, projections based on realist theories of hegemony 
are based on poorly specified indicators of change (see 
Nye 2011b, chapter 6). Even after monopolies over a new 
technology erode, it is possible to develop normative 
frameworks for governance of an issue area.
CONCLUSIONS
Predicting the future of the normative structures that will 
govern the various issues of cyberspace is impossible 
because of the newness and volatility of the technology, 
the rapid changes in economic and political interests, 
and the social and generational cognitive evolution that 
is affecting how state and non-state actors understand 
and define their interests. While the explanations are 
complementary, it seems likely that liberal institutionalist 
and cognitive regime theories will provide better tools for 
understanding those changes than oversimplified theories 
of hegemonic transition.
One projection does seem clear. It is unlikely that there 
will be a single overarching regime for cyberspace any 
time soon. A good deal of fragmentation exists now and 
is likely to persist. The evolution of the present regime 
complex, which lies halfway between a single coherent 
legal structure and complete fragmentation of normative 
structures, is more likely. Different sub-issues are likely 
to develop at different rates, with some progressing and 
some regressing in the dimensions of depth, breadth 
and compliance. Some areas, such as crime, in which 
states have common interests against third-party free 
riders, seem ripe for interstate agreement, even if only an 
agreement to assist in legal and forensic efforts (Tikk 2011). 
Other issues, such as privacy, may see compromises in the 
context of trade negotiations, which apparently have no 
direct connection with the cyber area. And some areas, 
such as war, may not be susceptible to formal arms control 
agreements, but may see the evolution of declaratory policy, 
confidence-building measures and rough rules of the road. 
Rather than global agreements, like-minded states may 
act together to avoid destabilizing behaviour, and later 
try to generalize such behaviour to a broader group of 
actors through means ranging from formal negotiation to 
development assistance. Whatever the outcomes, analysts 
interested in the development of normative structures 
for the governance of cyberspace should avoid the over-
simplified popular dichotomies of a “war” between the 
ITU and ICANN. Instead, they would do better to view the 
problems in the full complexity offered by regime theories 
and the concept of regime complexes.
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